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1 Introduction
The astonishing rise of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) brought blockchain-based crypto-tokens
to the forefront of the policy, academic, and regulatory debate. An ICO is a form or crowd-
funding in which startups (or loose groups of developers) raise capital by selling crypto-
tokens. The first notable ICO was that of Ethereum in 2014, raising USD 2.3 million in
approximately 12 hours. ICO activity exploded in 2017 and, especially, in 2018, with ICOs
raising more that USD 6 billion in a single month (July 2018, from Lyandres, Palazzo, and
Rabetti, 2018, see Figure 1). For comparison, in 2016 total Venture Capital investment in
Europe was USD 4.7 billion (OECD, 2017).
However, these extraordinary events partially obscured a crucial fact: that in the vast
majority of cases, teams going through an ICO plan to profit from their work by selling
more tokens at a later stage. That is, the sale of tokens constitutes not only an innovative
fundraising mechanism, but also a novel way to profit from software development. I call
the sale of tokens as a mean to earn profits seigniorage.1 Seignorage is by far the dominant
business model in the blockchain sector, covering the largest ICOs to date and at least 90%
of the total crypto-market.2 Even more interesting is that, as I will discuss in more details
later, it is possible to earn profits via seigniorage only if the source code behind both the
software and the token itself are publicly available. Seignorage therefore constitutes the only
way in which the developer of an open-source software can earn a direct financial reward (in
addition to indirect benefits derived from, for example, career concerns).
To illustrate how seigniorage works, consider a population of agents who wish to ex-
change either a good or a service, but are prevented from doing so by the lack of required
infrastructure. If this exchange can occur in electronic form, then the missing infrastructure
may be a protocol, that is, the technical specifications governing the communication between
machines. A developer who creates the missing protocol can profit from his innovation by
simultaneously creating a token, and by establishing that all exchanges that occur using the
protocol must use this token.3 The developer owns the initial stock of tokens so that, if the
1 Seigniorage is defined as the profits earned by issuing currency, and is a well known concept from
monetary economics. What is novel here is that, thanks to blockchain technology, it can be used to create
incentives for innovation.
2 At the time of writing, among the top-30 tokens by market capitaliztion, 28 constitute both a source of
financing and of profits for the respective developers. These 28 tokens represent 90% of the total crypto-
market (data from www.coinmarketcap.com).
3 Prices could be expressed in fiat currency (that is, in some numeraire). The important point is that they
need to be settled using the token.
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Fig. 1: From Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti (2018) page 35: “This figure reports monthly
values of the number of ICOs that raise at least U.S.D. 10,000 (left axis) and the total
amount raised across all ICOs each month (billions, right axis). Monthly observations
go from August 2016 to November 2018. The observations reported for the month of
August 2016 group all 33 ICOs up to August 2016”.
protocol is successful, there will be a positive demand for tokens, a positive price for tokens
and positive profits earned by the developer.4
Blockchain enables seigniorage because it allows the developer to commit to a given
supply of tokens (see Section 2.1 for additional details on blockchain). This is because the
rules determining whether (and how) the supply of tokens increases over time can initially
be specified within the protocol. If the protocol is open source, this commitment is credible
because anybody can verify the software’s source code. Similarly, blockchain can be used to
specify that only a given token can be used to transact using the protocol. Of course, this
type of commitment could be achieved by other means, for example by complex institutional
design (e.g., creating a “central bank”) or by building reputation over time. But these
alternative means are very expensive and not widely available.Blockchain instead generates
commitment by computer code.
4 Alfred Wenger, a prominent venture capitalist, provides one of the first descriptions of this mechanism:
“You can think of these [tokens] like the tokens you might buy at a fair to get on a ride: different operators
can have their own rides and set their own price in terms of tokens. You only need to buy tokens once (in
exchange for fiat currency) and then can use them throughout the fair.” See https://continuations.com/
post/148098927445/crypto-tokens-and-the-coming-age-of-protocol.
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I build a model in which a developer can sell tokens both to raise funds and, novel with
respect to the existing literature, to then profit from his/her work. More precisely, in every
period, a developer exerts effort and invests in the development of a protocol. Initially, the
developer owns the entire stock of tokens, and can sell some to investors via an Initial Coin
Offering (ICO), modeled as an auction. Subsequently, in every period, he can sell or buy
tokens on a frictionless market for tokens in which investors are active. The developer can
use the proceedings of the sale of tokens to either invest in the development of the protocol
or to consume.
The first result is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-ICO period there
is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer to develop the software
in the future, this expectation should be priced into the token’s current price. But if this
is the case, then the developer is strictly better off by selling all of his tokens, which allows
him to “cash in” on future developments without doing any work. On the other hand, if
investors expect no development to occur, the price of the token will be low. The developer
should hold onto as many tokens as possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the
protocol, so to increase the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore,
the equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer is
indifferent between selling all of his tokens (and therefore not developing the protocol) or
keeping a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing the development of
the protocol). The developer randomizes between these two options, in a way that leaves
investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any given period.
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO, the developer is therefore facing a
tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in every subsequent period with positive probability he will sell
all of his tokens and not develop the software. Postponing the ICO, therefore, prevents the
creation of a market for tokens and works as a commitment device, because the developer
will hold all of his tokens for certain and set the corresponding level of effort and investment.
However, if the developer does not sell tokens at ICO, he may lack the funds to invest in the
development of the protocol. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if
his own assets are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment in the development
of the protocol, but may hold the ICO otherwise.
The model therefore delivers two main insights. The first one is that, as with other forms
of external financing, selling some tokens at ICO weakens the developer’s future incentives
to develop the protocol, and therefore leads to inefficiencies. The interesting part of this
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result is the specific form of this inefficiency: in every period after the ICO the developer
may sell all his tokens and stop the development of the protocol. The second insight is more
subtle but more interesting. Even assuming that the developer has sufficient funds to invest
optimally (so that the first source of inefficiency is absent), his level of effort and investment
are set so as to maximize the value of his stock of tokens. This value depends on the volume
of the transaction occurring using the protocol during a given period of time.5 Instead, in
the first best, effort and investment should be set so as to maximize the present discounted
value of the surplus generated by the protocol. That is, the fact that the protocol will be
used and generate surplus over multiple periods is completely disregarded by the developer.
Interestingly, the level of effort and investment set by the developer may be above or
below their first best levels. Back-of-the envelope calculations using data from the Ethereum
blockchain suggest that, conditional on exerting positive effort, the equilibrium level of effort
and investment is above the welfare-maximizing level. This is due to the fact that, at present,
only a small fraction of tokens is used by users, with the vast majority being held by investors.
In light of the model, this implies a very high sensitivity of the price of token to the developer’s
effort and investment.6
The model delivers a number of other interesting results. For example, both at ICO
and post-ICO there may be multiple equilibria. Because of a cash constraint, the developer
cannot invest in the development of the protocol more than his assets. It follows that the
developer may sell some of his tokens, as a way of accumulating assets to finance the future
development of the protocol. The number of tokens that the developer needs to sell in order
to finance future investments depends on the current price for tokens, therefore generating a
coordination problem. If the price is high, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens, and his
incentives to invest and develop the software in the future are high. This, in turn, justifies
the high price for tokens today. If instead the price today is low, in order to finance future
development, the developer needs to sell more tokens. But then his incentives to develop
the software will be low, which justifies the fact that the price is low today. Therefore, at
ICO there could be multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, while post-ICO there could be
5 This will result from an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a country’s
price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money.
6 This result is subject to many caveats. The main one is that over- or under-provision of effort and
investment should emerge as a function of the fraction of tokens held by investors in the long run, that
is, when the software is mature and all major developments stop. Arguably, no blockchain project has yet
reached this stage. I will argue that, at present, the best candidate for such an analysis is Ethereum, because
among the oldest and better established projects, it is the one in which it is easier to identify the fraction of
tokens used vs kept by investors.
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multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides the reader
with the necessary background information on blockchain, ICOs and seigniorage, and also
discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents a model of seigniorage. Section 4 solves
for its equilibrium. Section 5 illustrates the first best of the model and compares it to its
equilibrium. Section 6 discusses some extensions to the model, such as the possibility of
using monopoly pricing (instead of seigniorage) and the possibility of raising funds from a
Venture Capitalists (instead of via an ICO). Section 7 concludes. Unless otherwise noted,
all proofs and mathematical derivations missing from the text are in the Appendix.
2 Background and relevant literature
2.1 Blockchain-based protocols
The key premise of this paper is that blockchain can be the technological foundation of
various other protocols. To illustrate this fact, it is useful to make an analogy between
blockchain and the Internet Protocol Suite.
The Internet Protocol Suite (commonly known as TCP/IP) was developed in the late ’60s
and early ’70s to allow for the decentralised transmission of data, that is, transmission of data
via a network of computers in which no node is, individually, essential for the well functioning
of the network. Financed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
it had the goal of increasing military communication resilience by moving from a hub-and-
spoke model of communication to a complete (or mesh) network model of communication.8
The Internet Protocol Suite is the technological foundation of a second set of protocols, also
called application layer protocols. Those protocols make use of TCP/IP to handle specific
types of data in a specific context: HTTP for accessing web pages; SMTP, POP, and IMAP
for sending and receiving emails; FTP for sending receiving files; and so on.
Blockchain further expands the possible operations that can be performed by a network
of computers in which no node is essential. Like TCP/IP, it allows for the decentralized
7 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for a given
sequence of effort and investment by the developer, there is a coordination problem among users, possibly
leading to the existence of a “high adoption” and a “low adoption” equilibrium. The novelty here is that, for
a given adoption equilibrium, there are multiple equilibrium sequences of effort and investment arising from
a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
8 See Hafner and Lyon (1998), in particular the description of the work of Paul Baran (pp 53-64).
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transmission of data, but also permits the decentralized storage, verification and manipu-
lation of data.9 Blockchain is also similar to TCP/IP in that it provides the foundation
for a number of other protocols. The most well-known is the Bitcoin protocol: a protocol
allowing a network of computers to store data (how many Bitcoins each address owns), and
to enforce specific rules regarding how these data can be manipulated (no double spending).
The Bitcoin protocol is not only the oldest and most widely known application of blockchain
technology, but also well illustrates an important point: absent blockchain technology, the
same type of data can be maintained only within a traditional organization (typically a
bank).
Numerous other open-source blockchain-based protocols currently exist or are actively
being developed. In addition to several cryptocurrencies (such as Monero, ZCash, Litecoin),
there are protocols for building decentralized computing platforms that can run any applica-
tion or software (see Ethereum, EOS, Cardano, NEO);10 protocols for decentralized real-time
gross settlement (see Ripple, Stellar); protocols enabling the creation of decentralized mar-
ketplaces for storage and hosting of files (see SIA, Filecoin, Storj), for renting in/out CPU
cycles (see Golem), for event or concert tickets (see Aventus), for e-books (see Publica);
protocols for generic e-commerce transactions (see Openbazaar); protocols creating fully de-
centralized prediction markets (see Augur, Gnosis), financial exchanges (see 0xproject), and
financial derivatives (see MakerDAO); protocols allowing the existence of fully decentralized
organizations (see Aragon) and virtual worlds (see Decentraland); and many more.
2.2 Blockchain and Seigniorage
An important difference between the protocols built on TCP/IP and those built on blockchain
is the way in which their developers are rewarded. The vast majority of protocols based on
TCP/IP are open source, free to adopt and use. The contributors to these projects are not
organized in a single, traditional company, but rather form a loosely-defined group around
one (or multiple) project leader(s) and are based on open collaboration (as is typical of
open source projects). These protocols are the backbone of the digital economy and created
9 Occasionally a distinction is made between blockchain and decentralized ledger technologies, where
blockchain refers to a specific way of maintaining a decentralized ledger. This distinction is not relevant
for the purpose of this paper. Another distinction is between “blockchain” meaning the technology, and “the
blockchain” meaning a specific application of the blockchain technology, usually the Bitcoin blockchain.
10 Decentralized computing platforms can also be seen as an operating system running over a network of
computers rather than a single machine. Developers can then create software (which in this context are
smart contracts) that is executed by the network rather than by a single machine.
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enormous value, yet none of this value was captured by its developers. Unsurprisingly, there
is little investment in maintaining and updating this digital infrastructure.
As already discussed in the Introduction, the development of blockchain-based proto-
cols can instead leverage financial incentives via seigniorage. This is possible whenever the
protocol must be used in conjunction with a token. In case of protocols creating decentral-
ized marketplaces, the token is typically the internal currency the marketplace. Similarly,
within decentralized computing platforms (e.g., Ethereum), users of the protocol must use
the protocol native token (e.g., Ether) to pay other users of the protocol (called miners or
validators) for executing some piece of software (called smart contracts). In the case of
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, people who need to exchange Bitcoins reward those who
process these transactions (called, again, miners) in two ways. One is direct: the sender
can directly pay some Bitcoins to the miner to process his transaction faster. The second is
indirect: the network awards miners with new bitcoins for their work. Because of its effect
on the price, this increase in the supply of bitcoins amounts to a transfer from the holders
of bitcoins to the miners.11 In other blockchain-based protocols, the use of the token can be
the most diverse and the most complex.12
If the token is necessary to operate a protocol, this token will have positive value as long
as the protocol will have some usage. Given this, the developers behind the protocol can
sell some tokens to investors in earlier periods. One way to sell a token is via an ICO. ICOs
are typically well advertised and, as already discussed in the introduction, sales of tokens at
ICOs exploded in 2017 and 2018. But tokens can be sold also on the open market, possibly
after the ICO. With few exceptions,13 either token sales on the open market are not disclosed,
or they are discussed only within blog posts and informal communication.14
Despite the difference in visibility between these two ways of selling tokens, recent work by
11 See also Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017).
12 For example, MakerDAO is a blockchain based protocol that allow users to create Collateralized Debt
Obligation (CDO) by locking a given amount of Ethers in a smart contract. The system is designed so that
the USD-value of these obligations is roughly constant. Its native token is MKR and has several uses. For
example, a user who wants retrieve his collateral will need to pay a fee established in MKR. Also, if the
value of the collateral falls below the nominal value of the CDO, the protocol will automatically liquidate the
collateral, and simultaneously sell newly created MKR so to cover the shortfall. MKR holders are therefore
bearing the risk associated with issuing the CDO. Finally, MKR holder can vote to change some parameters
of the protocol (such as, the fee required to retrieve a collateral or the threshold below which a collateral is
liquidated).
13 For example, Ripple announces in advance a schedule for selling parts of its XRP stock, see https:
//ripple.com/insights/q1-2018-xrp-markets-report/.
14 For example, see this blog post by the Ethereum foundation https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/07/
2394/.
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Howell, Niessner, and Yermack (2018) and Amsden and Schweizer (2018) show that projects
that go through an ICO sell only about half of their tokens at ICO, with the rest being kept
by the founding team.15 This indicates that projects that go through an ICO expect to sell
as many tokens at ICO as on the market post-ICO. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for
some projects to skip the ICO stage and only sell tokens on the market, in a practice known
as “airdrop”. This is typically the case for forks (i.e., derivations) of other projects, such as
Stellar (a fork of Ripple and currently the ninth most valuable blockchain project by market
capitalization), Bitcoin cash and Bitcoin Gold (forks of Bitcoin).16
2.3 Relevant literature
The novelty of this paper with respect to the existing literature studying blockchain-based
tokens is to argue that selling tokens is both a mean to raise funds and a mean to earn a
profit.
Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) is the only other paper builiding a model in which tokens can
be sold to earn a profit (but not to raise funds). They study the incentives to maintain a
decentralized platform by a platform owner, who can create new tokens which can be either
consumed or used to pay workers who will improve the value of the platform. Their main
result is that the platform owner will choose the monetary policy that maximizes the value
of the platform. This result may look, at first, in contrast with those derived here. However,
in my model the developer (also the platform owner) chooses both how many tokens to sell
on the market and how much effort to exert in the development of the protocol powering the
decentralized platform. In Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) instead there is no such effort, and
hence the model better fits a situation in which the technology underlying the decentralized
platform already exists.
15 More precisely, Howell et al. (2018) finds that 54% of tokens are sold at ICO, while Amsden and Schweizer
(2018) put this number at 60%. Interestingly, Howell et al. (2018) also find that only about one third of the
ICOs in their sample include vesting provisions that lock up the tokens not sold at ICO (or part of them)
for some amount of time.
16 Forks of existing projects typically distribute their tokens among the holders of the tokens associated
with the project from which they are forking, sometimes creating additional tokens and allocating them to
the founding team. For example, the developers behind Bitcoin Gold allocated to each Bitcoin holder an
equal amount of Bitcoin Gold tokens, plus they created 100,000 new tokens and allocated them to themselves.
Airdrops are becoming particularly popular with projects built on EOS, a decentralized computing platform
(currently the fourth most valuable blockchain project by market capitalization). These projects distribute
20-30% of their tokens for free, wait for the token to start trading, and then sell part of their stock of tokens
on financial exchanges. The goal seems to be to gain publicity, and to avoid the (few) legal constraints of an
ICO.
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The rest of the literature studying tokens has focused on the ICO. This literature can
be divided into two parts. Most closely related are papers studying the role of tokens in
decentralized digital platforms, where a decentralized platform is the peer-to-peer network
generated by a blockchain-based protocol. All those papers take as given the existence of
a protocol powering the decentralized platforms, and study how the presence of a native
token affects its functioning. Sockin and Xiong (2018), Cong, Li, and Wang (2018), Bakos
and Halaburda (2018), and Li and Mann (2018) argue that because of network externalities
there could be coordination failures in the adoption of a decentralized platform. They study
the role of tokens and they way they are sold in achieving the high-adoption equilibrium.
A second strand of literature has studied ICOs held by startups that may be completely
unrelated to blockchain. In this case, the tokens sold represent a contract between issuers
and token holders.17 For example, a token may represent a voucher and therefore give the
right to acquire a good or a service from the issuer, or may represent a claim on a business
revenues. This use of blockchain-based tokens is studied in Catalini and Gans (2018), Chod
and Lyandres (2018) and Garratt and van Oordt (2019), who assume that tokens represent
a pre-sale of output, that is, a firm issues tokens and simultaneously commit to accepting
those tokens as sole mean of payment in the future. It is also studied in Malinova and Park
(2018) who assume that tokens can represent either a pre-sale of output, or a revenue-share
agreement. In all those models, the seller of a token also sells a product or a service, which is
what generates a profits. That is, the token only serves as fundraising tool. Instead, in case
of tokens linked to blockchain-based protocols, a developer (or a group of developers) releases
the protocol as an open-source, free to use piece of software, and earn profits exclusively via
the sale of tokens.
There is a small but growing literature building economic models to study how blockchain
works (see, for example Catalini and Gans, 2016; Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017;
Dimitri, 2017; Prat and Walter, 2018; Ma, Gans, and Tourky, 2018; Budish, 2018). Within
this literature, closely related is Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2018), in which
the price of a token and incentives of miners (i.e., the computers that process transactions
and therefore constitute the nodes of the Bitcoin blockchain) are determined in the equi-
librium of a game-theoretic model. Also in my paper, prices and incentives are determined
in equilibrium, but the interest is in the incentives to develop the protocol rather than pro-
17 Here contract is synonymous with agreement. A different matter is whether this agreement can be legally
enforced.
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cessing transactions. The portion of the model that determines the equilibrium price of the
token borrows heavily from Athey, Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2017), who propose an
equilibrium model of the price of Bitcoin. The novelty with respect to their paper is that,
here, the demand for tokens is a function of the developer’s effort and investment, while
the “quality” of the Bitcoin protocol is taken as given in their model (but is unknown and
therefore discovered over time).18
Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform-based digital currencies, such as Facebook
credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with the tokens discussed
in the Introduction, because they can be used to perform exchanges on a specific platform.
They are, however, controlled by their respective platforms, which decide on their supply
and the extent to which they can be traded or exchanged. This may explain why, despite
some initial concerns,19 these currencies have neither gained wide adoption, nor generated
significant profits for the platform issuing them.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on innovation and incentives, in particular
to the literature studying the motivation behind contributions to open-source software (see
the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002). In this respect, I show that open source—
with its organizational structure and ethos—can coexist with strong financial incentives. Of
course, an open question not addressed here is whether or not financial rewards will crowd
out other motives (see, for example, Benabou and Tirole, 2003); that is, whether the open
source ethos will be compromised by the introduction of strong financial incentives.
3 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking investors
and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the developer exerts
effort et and invests it into the development of a blockchain-based protocol. The development
of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the developer exits the game and users starts
using the protocol to transact with each other. The protocol can be used indefinitely. At
18 A second, more technical, difference is that Athey et al. (2017) assume that the demand for Bitcoins by
investors is zero in the long run. I, instead, allow this demand to be positive. Indeed, the fraction of tokens
held by investors in the long run will be an important determinant of the equilibrium of the model and of
its efficiency properties.
19 See, for example “Could a gigantic nonsovereign like Facebook someday launch a real currency to compete
with the dollar, euro, yen and the like?” by Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29, 2012 (available
at http://www.slate.com/articles/business/cashless_society/2012/02/facebook_credits_how_the_social_
network_s_currency_could_compete_with_dollars_and_euros_.html).
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the beginning of the game, the developer establishes that all transactions using the protocol
must be conducted using a specific token, with total supplyM , fully owned by the developer.
In period to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction. This
stage is the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and its date to is chosen by the developer.
In each period after the ICO, but before the developer exits the game (that is, in every
t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}), first the developer exerts effort and invests, then a frictionless market
for tokens opens. In every period after the developer exits (that is, in every t > T ), first
the market for tokens opens and then users use the protocol. See Figure 3 for a graphical
representation of the timeline.
1 ≤ t < to (pre-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Auction for tokens
to < t ≤ T (post-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Market for tokens opens
The developer exits in period T
t = T + 1
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
Fig. 2: Timeline
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints. They can
purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequent period. Importantly,
when buying or selling tokens on the market, they are price takers: their net demand for
tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token prices from period t onward, which they
take as given. Investors do not discount the future. They are indifferent between purchasing
any amount of tokens in period t whenever pt = p¯t ≡ maxs>t {E[ps]}, where p¯t is the largest
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future expected price. If instead pt > p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is
zero. Finally, if pt < p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is not defined.
The developer. Call Qt ≤M the stock of tokens held by the developer at the beginning
of period t, with Q1 = M . Call:
At ≡ a+
t−1∑
s=1
[(Qs −Qs+1) · ps − is] = At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt)
the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where a is the
developer’s initial assets (cash) and the rest are resources earned from the sale of tokens in
previous periods, net of the investments made. To account for the fact that during periods
t < to the developer cannot sell tokens, I impose that pt ≡ 0 for all t < to. Intuitively, in any
t < to the developer cannot sell tokens but can destroy them, which is equivalent to selling
them at price zero. Of course, this will not happen in equilibrium.
In every period, the developer maximizes his end-of-life assets AT+1 minus the disutility
of effort. He faces a per-period feasibility constraint determining the largest investment that
can be made:
it ≤ At,
and a per-period cash constraint determining the maximum amount of tokens that can be
purchased by the developer:
pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0} ≤ At − it.
Note that the cash constraint is always tighter than the feasibility constraint, which can
therefore be disregarded.
Similar to investors, the developer does not discount the future either. Hence, his problem
can be rewritten in recursive form as, for t < T :
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max
Qt,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + Ut+1(Qt+1, At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)+
λt(At − it − pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})} ,
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and for t = T :
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint. The se-
quence of effort, investments and Qt are assumed observable by investors and users .
Users. In period T the development of the protocol stops and users start using the protocol.
To do so, in every period they first purchase tokens and then use them to transact with other
users using the protocol. The total value (in US dollars) of all exchanges occurring using the
protocol during a given period is the value of the protocol and is defined as:
VT =
T∑
s=1
f(es, is), (1)
where f(., .) is increasing in both arguments, concave in et, with limi→∞
{
∂f(et,it)
∂it
}
= 0 for
all et. For ease of notation, I assume that each user can access the market for tokens only
once in every period.20 This implies that, in every t > T , those who use the protocol to
purchase goods and services have a demand for tokens in period t equal to VT
pt
, while those
who use the protocol to sell goods or services have a supply of tokens in period t+ 1 equal,
again, to VT
pt
.
Equation (1) is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the fact that the developer’s effort
and investment generates an improvement of the protocol (i.e., lower transaction costs, more
ease of use, increased security, and reliability), which in turns induces more users to use
the protocol and perform more/larger transactions. Being parsimonious, however, it also
abstracts away from important elements. For example, because of network externalities, it
is possible that for a given sequence of effort and investment there is both a “high adoption”
equilibrium (in which the value of the protocol is high) and a “low adoption” equilibrium (in
which the value of the protocol is low). With a minimal loss of generality, the reader can
interpret VT as the value of the protocol in one of these equilibria, the one that the developer
expects to emerge.21 Also, the justification behind (1) implies that the token is used as a
20 That is, the velocity of the token is 1. Assuming a different velocity will introduce an additional
parameter without affecting the results.
21 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the “low” adoption equilibrium may not exist for some
sequences of effort and investment, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and investment maps into
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mean of exchange. If the token is necessary in order to use the protocol, but without being a
means of exchange, then VT is a measure of token usage which is not necessarily equal to the
value of the exchanges occurring using the protocol. All of the results presented are robust
to this different interpretation, with the exception of the back-of-the envelope calculations
in Sections 5 and 6.1.
4 Solution
4.1 Periods t ≥ T
I start by solving for the price of the token from period T onward, using the behavior of users
(as captured by equation (1)) and an appropriate equilibrium selection criterion (introduced
below).
The fact that no development is possible after period T implies that the price of the token
must be constant from period T onward. Investors are therefore indifferent between holding
cash and holding the token, which implies that there are multiple equilibria: the price of the
token will depend on the stock of tokens held by the investors, who are indifferent between
holding any level of tokens. To break this indeterminacy, I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In equilibrium, the stock of tokens held by investors from period t ≥ T is
γ ·M for γ ∈ [0, 1).
That is, out of the many equilibria possible, I am interested here in those in which the
demand for tokens by investors is a constant fraction of the stock of tokens M .
The term γ ·M therefore represents the “speculative” demand for tokens: the demand for
tokens driven by the expectation that future investors will also demand γ ·M . Next to this
demand, in every period there is a demand and a supply for tokens originating from users.
Because the stock of tokens available to users is (1− γ) ·M , the price for tokens must solve:
pT =
VT
(1− γ)M .
It follows that the price at which the developer can sell his token is strictly increasing in
the value of the protocol VT—and hence in the sequence of effort and investments made by
the developer. As we will see, this result will play a central role in solving for developer’s
the value of the protocol.
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problem. But before doing so, it is important to point out that the results presented below
are robust to different assumptions about what happens from period T onward (i.e., different
assumptions regarding the demand and supply of tokens by users or investors), provided that
under these different assumptions pT is increasing in VT .
4.2 The developer’s problem
In solving the developer’s problem, the following observation will play a key role. Because
investors are price takers, in every t > to their demand for tokens depend exclusively on pt
and p¯t (the largest future price) and not on the quantity of tokens sold by the developer
in period t.22 In particular, if pt = p¯t, then investors are indifferent between purchasing
any amount of tokens. At the same time, the equilibrium price in period t should reflect
effort and investments made prior to t. Hence, because the instantaneous demand for tokens
by investors is inelastic to the supply of tokens, in every period the developer can sell any
amount of tokens at the market price. But because prices react to effort and investment
which in turn depend on the stock of tokens held by the developer, the amount sold by the
developer in each period will have an effect on future prices.
It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by considering two cases. The first is the “rich
developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets a are sufficient to cover the optimal
level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash constraint is never binding and
can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor developer”, in which the cash constraint
is binding for at least one period.
4.2.1 Rich developer
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s utility can be written as, for t ≤ T−1:
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it − 1
2
e2t + U˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
,
and for t = T :
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
22 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point is simply that in a
price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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Note that (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it is the cash generated in period t, net of investment. Because
there is no discounting and the cash constraint is never binding, I can include this cash in
period-t utility function (i.e., the period in which it is generated), even if it is consumed in
period T .
Consider the last period of the developer’s life. The fact that pT increases in eT and iT
immediately implies that U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. The argument is quite standard: if eT
and iT were fixed, then pT would be fixed and U˜T (QT ) would be linear in QT . However, the
optimal eT and iT are:23
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗(QT ))
QT
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
(2)
i∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗(QT ), i)
QT
(1− γ)M − i
}
. (3)
As long as either e∗(QT ) or i∗(QT ) are positive for some QT ≤M (an assumption maintained
in order to avoid trivialities), then optimal effort and investment react to changes in QT ,
which implies that U˜T (QT ) must grow faster than linearly.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For given eT−1 and iT−1, the developer
chooses QT so as to maximize pT−1(QT−1 −QT ) + U˜T (QT ), which, for given pT−1, is strictly
convex in QT because U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. It follows that the developer’s problem has
a corner solution: depending on pT−1, the developer will either sell all of his tokens (when
pT−1 is high), purchase as many tokens as possible (when pT−1 is low), or be indifferent
between these two options. The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
pT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (4)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens at the
beginning of period T .
Note, however, that if investors expect the developer to sell all of his tokens, they should
also expect no effort or investment in period T , and therefore pT−1 should be low. If instead
23 With a slight abuse of notation, I ignore the time index when writing optimal effort and optimal invest-
ment. I show below that these functions are, in fact, time invariant. Note also that, under the assumptions
made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. However, they may not be unique. In what follows,
for ease of exposition, I implicitly assume that they are indeed unique, although no result depends on this
assumption.
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they expect the developer to set QT = M , they should expect maximum effort and invest-
ments in period T and therefore pT−1 should be high. Thus, we have an anti-coordination
problem, which implies that the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price will be
such that the developer is indifferent, and the developer will randomize between QT = 0 and
QT = M .
More precisely, if the developer sells all of his tokens in period T − 1, then the price in
period T will be VT−1
(1−γ)M . If instead the developer purchases M tokens in period T − 1, then
pT =
VT−1+f(e∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M . Because investors must be indifferent between purchasing in period
T or period T − 1, it must be that:
pT−1 =
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all of his tokens in period T −1, which
using (4) can be written as:
αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
For intuition, note that (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M) is the cost generated by holding M tokens,
coming from the additional effort and investment that the developer will exert in period T .
Instead:
M · f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
is the benefit of setting QT = M , coming from the increase in the value of these tokens due
to the developer’s effort and investment in period T . αT−1 is therefore equal to the ratio
between cost and benefit of holdingM tokens in period T . Because effort and investment are
chosen optimally, the benefit should be at least as large as the cost, and therefore αT−1 ≤ 1.
The following proposition shows that these results generalize to every period in which
the market for tokens operates.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}:
1. Optimal effort and investment for given Qt are e∗(Qt) and i∗(Qt), given by (2) and
(3),
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2. The developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
αt =
1 if t = T(1− γ) (e∗(M))2/2+i∗(M)
f(e∗(M),i∗(M)) otherwise
(5)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− αt,
3. The price of tokens as a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
Vt + (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M . (6)
The proposition is based on the fact that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly convex and, therefore, in
every period t < T the equilibrium price must be such that the agent is indifferent between
holding all of his tokens and selling all of his tokens. But this also implies that the agent
is indifferent between selling all of his tokens in period t or holding M in every period until
T . The benefit of exerting effort and of investing in a given period is therefore given by the
resulting change in pT , which is constant over time and given by (2) and (3).
Hence, whenever Qt = M the value of the protocol increases by f(e∗(M), i∗(M)) in period
t, while if Qt = 0 the value of the protocol does not change in period t. The probability that
Qt = 0 is such that investors are indifferent between holding the token at t− 1 or at t, and
is also constant over time. It follows that the price in period t (Equation (6)) reflects past
effort and past investment via the term Vt, as well as expected future effort and investment
via the term (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M)). This expression can also be interpreted as the
law of motion of the price, because it implies that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token
will increase by:
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
with probability:
1− (1− γ) e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
,
and will decrease by:
1
M
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))
)
,
otherwise.
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Period to (the ICO) is characterized by the fact that tokens are sold via an auction.
Hence, contrary to all subsequent periods, in period to the price of a token depends on the
number of tokens sold, which isM−Qto . Again, in equilibrium, investors must be indifferent,
and therefore, for any number of tokens sold at ICO, it must be that pto = pto+1. Hence,
whenever to < T , the developer’s problem at ICO can be written as:
max
Qto+1
{
U˜to+1(Qto+1) + (M −Qto+1)pto
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
+ (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1 + (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}}
=
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
M · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
= U˜to+1(M),
where the first and the last equality follow from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly (under the
assumption that the developer sells all of his tokens in period to+1). The developer therefore
anticipates that the price of tokens will be the same at ICO and in the following period, in-
dependently from how many token he sells. The number of tokens sold, however, determines
the equilibrium level of effort and investment in period to+1. By choosing Qto+1 = M , the
developer maximizes effort and investments in period to+1, and therefore the price in period
to+1. If instead to = T , then the developer sells all of his tokens during the ICO, and then
exits the game. The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer does not
sell any tokens at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort and investment
in all t ≤ to + 1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead the ICO occurs at period
T , then the developer sells all of his tokens at ICO.
Proof. In the text.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market for tokens is open and the
developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability 1.
With respect to the optimal timing of the ICO, the previous proposition shows that
optimal effort and investment between period 1 and to+1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M). In all
subsequent periods, instead, the existence of the market for tokens creates a commitment
problem: the value of the protocol is maximized when the developer holds M tokens in
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every period until T , but this cannot happen in equilibrium. From period to+2 onward, the
developer exerts effort and invests with probability less than one, which implies the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T or in period
T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1, the developer will auction off 0 tokens,
and will sell M tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO is in period T , the
developer will sell all of his tokens via the auction. Holding the ICO in period T−1 or period
T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the developer does not sell any tokens before period
T and sells all of his tokens in period T . As a consequence, effort and investment are e∗(M)
and i∗(M) with probability 1 in every period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich developer”
case) if and only if a ≥ T · i∗(M).
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need to sell
tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment for T periods.
Finally, it is easy to check that the developers’ utility does not depend on the total
stock of tokens M . From (2) and (3) we know that the equilibrium sequence of effort and
investment depends on M exclusively via the share of tokens held by the developer. This
share is 1 for t ≤ to, and can be either 1 or 0 for to < t ≤ T (with the probability of being
1 or 0 given by 5, also independent from M). This implies that VT and, as a consequence,
ptM are independent from M . The developer’s utility is therefore independent from M for
any to.
4.2.2 Poor developer
The rich developer case focuses on one side of seigniorage: the incentives provided to the
developer. It shows that the developer will hold the ICO just before exiting the game, as a
way to commit to the highest level of effort and investment in every period.
There is, however, a second side of seigniorage: its ability to channel funds from investors
to the developer, to be then used in the development of the protocol. I now introduce this
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aspect into the model by assuming that the developer is “poor”, in the sense that a < T ·i∗(M):
the developer cannot invest efficiently in all periods, and the cash constraint could be binding.
To focus on the role of the cash constraint, I introduce the following functional form:
f(e, i) ≡ g(e)1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function, and g(e) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Hence, i is an essential input in the development of the protocol, because effort is productive
only if i ≥ i. However, investing more that i is also not productive. The choice of optimal
investment, therefore, simplifies to the choice between two levels: i and 0.
Given this, period-T effort and investment are:
eˆT (QT , iT ) ≡
e
∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
if iT ≥ i
0 otherwise
(7)
iˆT (QT , AT ) ≡
i if i ≤ maxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise.
(8)
To avoid trivial equilibria in which there is never any effort or investment, I furthermore
assume that:
i < maxe
{
g(e)
1
1− γ −
1
2
e2
}
, (A2)
that is: there is a level of QT for which the developer will invest and exert positive effort
whenever his assets are sufficient to do so. I call the threshold level Qˆ, implicitly defined as:
Qˆ ≡ Q : i = maxe
{
g(e)
Q
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
. (9)
In the remainder of this section, I fully solve for the equilibrium in periods T and T − 1,
depending on whether the ICO happened in period T , T − 1 or in any earlier period. I will
only informally discuss the equilibrium in periods before T − 1. Nonetheless, I will provide
a characterization of the optimal timing of the ICO.
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Case 1: to = T . If the ICO occurs in the last period, then optimal effort and investment
in period T are given by (7) and (8). The price of a token is therefore:
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT < ig(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
In period T − 1, the choice of optimal investment affects AT and the period-T optimal
effort and investment. This is relevant whenever i ≤ AT−1 < 2i, that is, whenever assets in
period T − 1 are not sufficient to invest optimally in both period T − 1 and period T . It is
immediately clear that, in this case, the final price is always VT−2+g(e
∗(M))
(1−γ)M , independent from
whether effort and investment are positive in period T − 1 or in period T . The same logic
applies to the choice of investment and effort in any earlier period. Define:
n ≡ argmaxk∈{1,2,...,T}{k · i ≤ a}, (10)
as the number of periods in which the developer can invest efficiently using his initial assets
exclusively. The above discussion implies that the developer will invest and exert effort for n
periods, and he is indifferent with respect to which ones. The following lemma summarizes
these observations.
Lemma 1 (ICO in period T ). Whenever to = T , the final value of the protocol is VT =
n · e∗(M).
Proof. In the text.
Case 2: to = T −1. If the ICO occurs in period T −1, then the developer can finance some
of the period T investment by selling tokens in period T −1. Remember that, in equilibrium,
the price of tokens at ICO pT−1 must be equal to pT . Hence, for given M −QT (i.e., tokens
sold at ICO), the price for tokens will be:
pT =
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT−1 − iT−1 + pT (M −QT ) < ig(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
(11)
Whenever AT−1− iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer does not have enough own funds
to invest in period T ), both LHS and RHS of (11) depend on pT , and therefore for given
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QT there are multiple equilibrium pT . For intuition, suppose that the developer announces
the sale of M − QT tokens at ICO. If investors expect pT to be low, they will drive down
pT−1 (the price at ICO), which implies that the level of investment achievable in period T
by selling M −QT at ICO may be below i, which justifies the initial expectation. If instead
investors expect pT to be high, in equilibrium pT−1 will also be high, which implies that the
level of investment achievable in period T by selling M − QT tokens at ICO may be above
i, which justifies the initial expectation. This can be interpreted as a coordination problem
among investors. For any number of tokens sold by the developer at ICO, investors may
coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to high effort and investment in period T , or
on a “low” equilibrium leading to low (or no) effort and investment in period T . Call p(QT )
the correspondence mapping QT to the equilibrium pT . We therefore have (see also Figure
4):
p(QT ) =

VT−1
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT <
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT >
VT−1
(1−γ)M{
VT−1
(1−γ)M ,
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
}
otherwise.
QT
VT−1
(1−γ)M
Qˆ M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT
Fig. 3: p(QT ) whenever i+ iT−1 > AT−1.
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Given this, we can solve for the utility-maximizing QT . As a preliminary step, the next
lemma shows that UT (QT , AT ) is convex in QT , provided that the developer has enough
wealth to invest, and provided that he has enough “skin in the game” in the sense that
QT > Qˆ.
Lemma 2. UT (QT , AT ) is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and is
otherwise linear in QT . UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (corresponding
to the marginal utility of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity at AT = i if and
only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Proof. By the same argument made in the previous case: UT (QT , AT ) is linear in QT when-
ever optimal investment and effort do not change with QT , and is strictly convex whenever
optimal investment and effort depend on QT . Similarly, UT (QT , AT ) is discontinuous in AT
whenever the level of wealth allows for the optimal level of investment.
From period T − 1 viewpoint, however, AT is a function of QT because:
AT = AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1,
where pT−1 ∈ p(QT ) is the price of tokens at ICO. Hence, the choice of QT determines both
period T ’s incentives to exert effort and whether the developer will have enough resources
to invest. The next lemma shows that the continuation value is maximized at:
Q∗T = M −
max{iT−1 + i− AT−1, 0}
pT−1
, (12)
which is the largest QT such that the developer can invest i in period T .
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to = T − 1). If Q∗T > Qˆ the developer chooses
QT = Q
∗
T ; there is positive investment and effort in period T . If instead Q∗T ≤ Qˆ then the
developer is indifferent between any QT , and there is no investment or effort in period T .
When AT−1 − iT−1 < i¯ multiple equilibria are possible and Q∗T may not be unique. When
AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i¯ the equilibrium is unique and Q∗T = M .
For intuition, remember that the developer has incentives to invest and exert effort in
period T only if QT > Qˆ. Whether QT > Qˆ is attainable depends on the cash constraint. If
this constraint is tight, Q∗T ≤ Qˆ and no level of QT that allows for positive investment will
generate sufficient incentives, and hence there will be no development in period T . If instead
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the cash constraint is sufficiently loose, then Q∗T > Qˆ and for some level of QT there will be
positive effort and investment in period T .
In this last case, multiple equilibria are possible. This is because the right hand side
of (12) may be neither monotonic nor continuous (remember that pT−1 ∈ p(QT )). That is,
even assuming that the investors can solve their coordination problem and therefore p(QT )
is a function and not a correspondence, there is an additional coordination problem between
developer and investors giving rise to multiple equilibrium Q∗T . Suppose that AT−1−iT−1 < i,
so that the developer needs to sell some tokens at ICO in order to finance future development.
If the price in period T is expected to be high, so will be the price in period T − 1 and, as
a consequence, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens in order to achieve iT = i. Because
he can hold a large fraction of tokens, future effort will be high, which implies that today’s
price for tokens should be high. Similarly, if period-T price is expected to be low, price at
ICO will be low, and the developer needs to sell a large fraction of his tokens, which implies
that future effort will be low, as should today’s price. If instead AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, then
the developer does not need to sell any tokens to finance his future investment and, as a
consequence, in the unique equilibrium Q∗T = M .
Consider now optimal investment and effort in period T−1. It is easy to see that optimal
effort is again given by (7). The choice of optimal investment, instead, has an inter-temporal
element to consider: for given initial assets, the choice of period T −1 investment affects the
equilibrium at ICO and therefore Q∗T . This is relevant whenever AT−1 < 2i, in which case
the developer may choose not to invest in period T − 1, so as to set Q∗T = M .
It is, however, easy to show that postponing the investment is never optimal. Suppose
that the developer has sufficient funds to invest in only one period. If the developer invests
in period T − 1, then total utility is:
VT−2 + g∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(M))2 − 1
2
(e∗(g∗(Q∗T ))
2.
If instead the developer does not invest in T − 1, he can set QT = M and achieve utility:
VT−2 + g∗(M)
(1− γ)M M − (e
∗(M))2.
Comparing the above two expressions, it is clear that the developer is better off using his
own funds for investing in period T − 1, and then financing period-T investment via the
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sale of tokens at ICO. This reasoning extends to any period prior to the ICO, and therefore
implies the following proposition.
Lemma 4 (ICO in period 2). Whenever to = T − 1, the final value of the protocol is:
VT =
3g∗(M) if a ≥ 3ing∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T ) otherwise,
where n is defined in (10) and Q∗T is defined in (12).
Proof. In the text.
Case 3: to < T − 1. If the ICO occurred in period to < T − 1, then in period T − 1 there
is a market for tokens. I start by considering the choice of QT , that is, how many tokens to
sell or buy on the market in period T − 1. For a given market price pT−1, the developer’s
utility as a function of QT is:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1− iT−1) +λT−1(AT−1− iT−1− pT−1 max {QT −QT−1, 0}).
There are similarities with the previous case (i.e., the case of an ICO in period T − 1).
Also here, the choice of QT determines the assets available in the following period. As a
consequence, the continuation value:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1),
is strictly convex in QT only for:
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ Q∗T ,
and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at Q∗T (where Q∗T
is defined in (12)).
There are, however, two important differences with the previous case. The first one is
that, here, the developer could have sold some tokens during a previous period, and therefore
it is possible that QT−1 < M . It follows that the cash constraint in period T − 1 may be
binding. In this respect, note that if the cash constraint in period T − 1 is binding, then
AT = 0 and the cash constraint in period T is binding. Conversely, if the period T cash
constraint is binding, we have AT = i, which implies that the period T − 1 cash constraint
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is not binding. Hence, in solving for QT , the only constraint that needs to be taken into
consideration is the period-T cash constraint.
Second, and most importantly, because investors are price takers, then the market price
in period T − 1 does not depend on QT . Only period-T price depends on QT , leading to the
same type of anti-coordination problem discussed in the “rich developer” case.
Lemma 5 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to < T − 1). If Q∗T ≤ Qˆ, then the developer is
indifferent between holding any level of QT . Effort and investment in period T are zero, so
that pT = pT−1 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ, then, in equilibrium, the developer is indifferent between setting
QT = 0 and setting QT = Q∗T . He sets QT = 0 with probability:
αT−1 =
(
1
2
(e∗(Q∗T )
2 + i
)(
Q∗T ·
g(e∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M
)−1
.
The equilibrium price is:
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T ))
(1− γ)M .
If AT−1−iT−1 ≤ i multiple equilibria are possible, while if AT−1−iT−1 > i the equilibrium
is always unique.
Contrary to the case considered in Lemma 3, here the presence of the market generates the
same anti-coordination problem discussed in the previous section. The developer randomizes
between selling everything and setting QT = 0 and holding the maximum number of tokens,
which is the minimum between the one at which period-T cash constraint is binding and M .
Similarly to the case considered in Lemma 3, whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i there could be
multiple equilibria. There could be an equilibrium in which pT−1 is high, which implies that
the developer needs to sell only a few tokens to finance future investment, and therefore
period-T effort is high. Next to this equilibrium, there could be one in which pT−1 is low,
which implies that the developer needs to sell many tokens to finance future investment, and
therefore period-T effort is low. If, instead, AT−1 − iT−1 > i, then the developer does not
need to sell any tokens to achieve iT = i, and this coordination problem is absent. In case
the market for tokens is open, there are therefore multiple mixed strategy equilibria, each
corresponding to a different Q∗T and a different pT−1.
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Deriving the equilibrium in earlier periods is complicated by the fact that the choice of
investment in every period affects the equilibrium in all subsequent periods. For example, the
choice of iT−1 affects Q∗T . Hence, the developer may want to set iT−1 = 0 even if AT−1 ≥ i
and QT−1 > Qˆ so as to achieve a higher Q∗T . Not only, but because there are multiple
equilibrium Q∗T , the choice of iT−1 may determine what equilibrium emerges in the market
for tokens. This difficulty extends to the choice of QT−2, because QT−2 determines iT−1.
Despite these issues, it is possible to characterize the developer’s choice of when to hold
an ICO. The reason is that every time the market is open, there is the basic anti-coordination
problem discussed earlier and the equilibrium is in mixed strategy. If instead the developer
does not hold the ICO and has sufficient funds to invest i¯, he will set a high level of effort
and investments with probability 1. Hence, if the developer’s funds are greater that i¯, he will
never want to hold the ICO. But if the developers funds are below i¯, then no development will
occur unless the developer holds the ICO. This observation implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium to = n, that is, the developer initially invests using his own
funds, and holds the ICO as soon as his funds are below i¯.
Proof. In the text.
5 First best
In the first best, effort and investment are set to maximize the present discounted value of
the surplus generated by the protocol.24 The equilibrium of the game differs from the first
best in several ways. As already discussed, if the developer is poor, he will hold the ICO after
exhausting his own funds. This is, however, inefficient because, in every post-ICO period,
the developer may set zero effort and zero investment, even if the social value of his effort
and investment is strictly positive.
More interestingly, even assuming that the developer is rich, there is an additional source
of inefficiency. The developer is setting effort and investment so as to maximize the value of
the protocol in period T , when he will exit the game. A minor observation is that the value of
the protocol in a given period (i.e., the value of the transactions that occur using the protocol)
is, in general, different from the social surplus generated by the protocol.25 A more important
24 The discount factor should be that of users.
25 The social surplus depends on the equilibrium utility/profits of users on the buying and selling side of
the protocol, as well as on their outside options.
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observation is that, in its objective function, the developer completely disregards the fact
that the protocol will generate value over multiple periods, instead focusing exclusively on
the period in which he will sell all of his tokens and exit the game.
Whether the developer’s effort and investment will be above or below their first best level
is, however, ambiguous as it depends on γ, which determines the elasticity of the price of
token to his effort and investment. If the speculative demand for tokens is sufficiently high,
then the developer will exert effort and investment above the first best. If instead it is low,
then the developer may exert effort and invest below the first best.
It is possible to resolve this ambiguity by introducing a few simplifying assumptions and
performing some back-of-the-envelope calculations. Consider the rich developer case, and
assume that the value of the protocol in a given period is a good approximation of the surplus
generated in that period. Social welfare is therefore:
∞∑
s=T
βs−TVT =
VT
1− β ,
where β is the user’s discount factor. The choice of effort and investment that maximize
social welfare is:
e∗∗ ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗∗)
1− β −
1
2
e2
}
(13)
i∗∗ ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗∗, i)
1− β − i
}
. (14)
By comparing the above expression with the equilibrium level of effort and investment (equa-
tions (2) and (3) for QT = M), it is clear that equilibrium effort and investment will be below
the efficient level if γ < β, and above the efficient level if γ > β.
Remember that γ is the fraction of tokens held by investors in period T when the devel-
oper exits the game. The empirical counterpart for γ is therefore the fraction of tokens held
by investors when the project is mature and (major) developments no longer occur, which
is a stage no blockchain-based protocol has yet reached. In my opinion, at present the best
possible estimate for γ comes by looking at Ethereum. With the exception of Ethereum, all
oldest, better established blockchain-based protocols are digital currencies (such as Bitcoin),
where only one operation is allowed: sending tokens. Because this operation is consistent
both with investors’ behavior and with usage (for example, sending remittances), it is very
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difficult to distinguish between users and investors.26 Instead, Ethereum is a decentralized
computing platform and is used primarily to run software, which are in this context called
smart contracts. The fraction of ETH (Ethereum native token) paid in fees is therefore a
measure of the value of the protocol Vt: the payments (in tokens) from users of Ethereum to
the nodes maintaining the Ethereum network, performed in exchange for a service—executing
a smart contract.27
After collecting data on the total fees paid on the Ethereum network,28 what remains
to do in order to derive γ is to define the length of a period. In the model, users can
exchange fiat money for tokens once in every period. The empirical equivalent of a “period”
is, therefore, the average number of days before a given token can be used again to pay a fee
(that is, the inverse of the velocity of ETH). Absent any good prior, I will consider different
possible values, from one to 30 days.
I therefore compute the average value of:
1− total transaction fees collected over n days
total stock of ETH
,
for the year 2018, where the n goes from 1 to 30. This value corresponds to γ, under the
assumption that a single period of the model corresponds to n days. I compare this value
to the discount factor over n days, computed assuming a daily discount factor of 0.015%
(approximately a 5% yearly discount factor). As Table 1 shows, for all values of n, the
estimated γ is orders of magnitude above β, which suggests that the equilibrium effort and
investment is above the efficient level.29
The above result is specific to the rich developer case. In the poor developer case, after
ICO, the developer invests and exerts effort with probability less than one. Furthermore,
conditional on exerting effort, because in every period he holds less than the full stock of
tokens, his level of effort and investment are lower than in the rich developer case. By
comparing the values for β and γ in Table 1 for n = 10, as long as the developer holds more
26 For more details on these difficulties, see Athey et al. (2017).
27 As in the Bitcoin network, these nodes also earn a “per-block” reward. In the case of Ethereum, however,
this reward is a much smaller component of the node’s total payoff. As a consequence, performing any
operation on the Ethereum network requires the payment of a fee.
28 Easily downloadable from several sources, such as https://etherscan.io/chart/transactionfee
29 In these calculations, I considered the total stock of ETH as the total number of ETH in the middle of
the year 2018 (that is, end of June 2018). The conclusion remains the same if I were to consider the total
number of ETH at the beginning of January 2018, at the end of 2018, or the average total number of ETH
over this period.
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n γ β
1 0,99999 0,00015
2 0,99999 0,00030
3 0,99998 0,00045
4 0,99998 0,00060
5 0,99998 0,00075
6 0,99998 0,00090
7 0,99997 0,00105
8 0,99997 0,00120
9 0,99996 0,00135
10 0,99996 0,00150
20 0.99992 0.00300
30 0.99988 0.00451
Tab. 1: Data from https://etherscan.io/chart, elaborated by the author
than 0.15% of the share of tokens, he will set effort and investment above the social optimum.
It seems likely, therefore, that conditional on exerting positive effort and investment, the level
of effort and investments will be above the socially optimal level, even in the “poor developer”
case.
6 Discussion
6.1 Seigniorage vs monopoly pricing
It is possible to compare seigniorage with more standard mechanisms, such as establishing
a set of fees/prices for using the protocol. Profits generated via seigniorage depend on the
value of the protocol in the moment at which the developer sells his tokens. Under standard
monopoly pricing, instead, the monopolist is able, in every period, to capture only a fraction
of the value of the protocol (which will depend on the elasticity of supply and demand). But
the monopolist is able to earn profits in every period; not only in one period.
Profits under seigniorage therefore depend on the value of the protocol in a given period,
while profits under standard monopoly pricing will accrue in every period. Which one is
larger is, again, ambiguous and crucially depends on γ: the speculative demand for tokens.
It is always possible to find a large enough γ such that profits under seigniorage are greater
than profits under monopoly pricing. For low γ, however, the ranking may reverse.
The same back-of-the envelope calculations reported in Table 1 are useful also here. Call
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τ the fraction of total value lost as deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing, and ν the
fraction of the remaining value that is captured by the monopolist in every period. Profits
earned via monopoly pricing from period T onward are therefore:
∞∑
s=T
βs−Tν(1− τ)VT = ν(1− τ)VT
1− β ,
which are greater than profits earned via seigniorage if and only if:
ν(1− τ) ≥ 1− β
1− γ .
The above inequality can be satisfied only if β > γ. However, the above calculations suggest
that, empirically, γ > β and hence profits under seigniorage are larger than profits under
monopoly pricing for any value of ν and τ .
6.2 Traditional investor
In the rich developer case, the developer uses his own resources to finance the investment
in the protocol, so that seigniorage plays a role exclusively because it generates profits
and provides incentives. In the poor developer case, seigniorage has the additional role of
providing resources to be invested into the development of the protocol. The comparison
between the two cases shows that the use of seigniorage to finance the investment in the
protocol is a second-best response to the developer’s lack of resource, because the value
of the protocol (and the developer’s payoff) is always higher in the rich developer case.
This observation suggests that an external investor (call it a traditional investor, possibly
a venture capital fund or a business angel) could provide capital to the developer so as to
move from the poor developer to the rich developer case, and by doing so generate extra
surplus. Under perfect contracting, therefore, in the poor developer case the traditional
investor would always provide funds to the developer. Traditional financing and seigniorage
are, in this case, complementary. If instead the investors and the developer are constrained
in the type of contracts they can sign, then the external investor may not provide funds.30
30 Regarding the fact that traditional investors are investing in companies that subsequently run an ICO, see
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/blockchain-ico-equity-financing-vc-investments/ and https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-03/hedge-funds-flip-icos-leaving-other-investors-holding-the-bag.
See also a recent paper by Chod and Lyandres (2018), who compare traditional venture capital financing
with financing via ICO under the assumption that they are perfect substitutes, and derive conditions under
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To illustrate this point, assume that the developer and the investor are limited to con-
tracts of the following type: the investor provides an amount of cash equal to I at the
beginning of the game, and receives a fraction of tokens ρ at ICO. It is quite easy to see that
such a contract has the advantage of postponing the ICO, and therefore extending the period
in which the developer develops the protocol with probability 1. However, it also implies
that in every period the level of effort and investment will be lower, because the developer
anticipates that his payoff will be (1− ρ)MpT . Clearly, there are cases in which the outside
investment will not happen.31
Overall, introducing a traditional investor is welfare-increasing: when a contract between
the developer and the investor is signed, it must be the case that the value of the protocol
increases (relative to no outside investment). But contractual frictions may prevent the tra-
ditional investor and the developer from finding an agreement, even when such an agreement
would be welfare-maximizing.
6.3 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s productivity
is private information. In this case, if the market for tokens is open, for a given price for
tokens there is a threshold productivity above which the developer wants to hold all tokens,
and below which the developer wants to sell all tokens. The price in every period is equal to
the expected price tomorrow, which depends on the developer’s expected contribution to the
protocol. In every period, if the developer is more productive that the market expectation,
he will purchase tokens and develop the protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less
productive than the market expectation, he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.32
The important observation is that, if at ICO the productivity of the developer is unknown
to investors, it will nonetheless be revealed over time. In the moment it is fully revealed,
the equilibrium of the game is again the one derived in the previous section. Asymmetry
which one dominates the other.
31 For example, if the developer already has enough funds to invest efficiently in the first T − 1 periods (so
that the need for external funds is small) and T is very large (so that the drop in effort and investment may
be small in every single period but have a large effect on the value of the protocol), then the developer and
the investor may not sign a contract.
32 The same argument can be made about wealth. If the developer’s wealth is private information and
affects the development of the protocol, then a developer who is richer than the market expectation about
his wealth will want to purchase all tokens and develop with probability one. Otherwise he will sell all tokens
and not develop.
6 Discussion 35
of information therefore implies that developers with above average productivity may con-
tribute to the development of the protocol with probability 1 for some periods. Conversely,
developers with below average productivity do not contribute to the protocols initially. After
the developer’s productivity is revealed, he will contribute with probability less than 1, as
in the symmetric information case.
Less obvious is the impact of asymmetric information on the timing of the ICO. A
developer of ability greater than the investors’ expectation may benefit from anticipating
the ICO, because he expects to exert effort and invest in the development of the protocol
with probability 1 for a few periods post-ICO. But if this is the case, then investors should
infer that a developer holding an ICO early is of high ability. This, clearly, cannot be an
equilibrium because, now, the high-ability developer no longer benefits from anticipating the
ICO. The full analysis of this problem is left for future work.
6.4 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized by a
productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by developer
j in period t generates an increase in the value of the protocol equal to qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all
developers are “rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding for any developer), in
every period t the equilibrium price of the token must be such that the developer with the
largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens or no tokens.33 If, furthermore, maxj q
j
t
is constant over time, then the model is formally identical to the one just solved. The only
difference is its interpretation: in every period a different developer (the most productive in
that period) may purchase tokens and contribute to the development of the protocol.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a market for
tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer works on the project
in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer contributes to the project only
with some probability. It follows that holding an ICO has an additional benefit because it
allows the most productive developer to contribute to the project in every period. Absent
the ICO, instead, the initial developer will set high effort and investment in every period,
but he may not be the most productive developer who could work on the project.
33 Suppose not: then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum level
of effort and investment in the following period. However, in that case, this developer’s contribution to the
protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies that he strictly prefers to sell
all of his tokens, leading to a contradiction.
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If instead some developers are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding), then
the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources to purchase
tokens and/or invest efficiently in the development of the protocol. The identity of the
developer that, in every period, develops the protocol (with some probability) depends partly
on productivity and partly on wealth.
7 Conclusion
An attentive reader may have noticed a troubling aspect of the model. In equilibrium,
the developer earns positive profits, users enjoy the full surplus generated by the protocol,
while at the same time investors are left indifferent. But where do the developer’s profits
come from? While this result is correct, it is an artifact of the partial-equilibrium nature of
the model. In a general equilibrium framework, introducing the token increases the supply
of money in the economy by an amount equal to the value of the stock of tokens (which
is also the developer’s profits), leading to an increase in the economy-wide price level.34
Initial holders of cash are therefore made worse off by the introduction of the token. In this
general-equilibrium framework, the developer should anticipate that an increase in the value
of the protocol will lead to an increase both of the price of the token and of the economy-
wide price level, therefore reducing the benefit of exerting effort and developing the protocol
(relative to the partial-equilibrium case considered in the body of the paper.) The effect of
the developer’s effort on the economy-wide price level is, however, likely to be negligible and
hence a partial-equilibrium analysis seems appropriate.
The model abstracts away from a few important elements. The first one is asymmetry
of information. This is an intentional feature of the model, and illustrates the fact that
the failure to develop a project following an ICO should not be considered exclusively as
the result of deception and fraud. Nonetheless, how asymmetry of information changes the
equilibrium of the model is an important question. As discussed in the text, the post-ICO
equilibrium only marginally changes with the introduction of asymmetric information. The
choice of the timing of the ICO is instead likely to be affected in a non-trivial way, especially
if an outside investor is present.
The model also abstracts away from competition, either from other open-source blockchain-
based protocols or traditional companies. Remember that, in the model, users enjoy the full
34 For general equilibrium models in which the economy-wide price level depends on the presence of a
cryptocurrency (Bitcoin), see Schilling and Uhlig (2018) and Garratt and Wallace (2018).
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surplus generated by the protocol. Hence, a competing open-source blockchain-based pro-
tocol (or a traditional company) can attract users only if it can generate a higher surplus,
either by providing a better technological solution or by attracting a larger user base. This
could affect the timing of the ICO. If there are “winner takes all” dynamics and network
effects, it is conceivable that the developer will want to anticipate the ICO, so as to build
a sufficiently large user base and prevent the entrance of competitors. However, assuming
that the source code is disclosed at ICO, holding an ICO earlier also gives the opportunity
for competitors to copy the code and imitate some features. The full treatment of both
asymmetry of information and competition is also left for future work.
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A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In the text I show that if U˜T (QT ) is strictly increasing and convex,
strictly so for some QT . Therefore, in equilibrium, in period T −1 the developer is indifferent
between selling all of his tokens or keeping all of his tokens. It follows that I can write:
U˜T−1(QT−1) = max
eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
that is, I can write the utility in period T − 1 assuming that the developer sells all of his
tokens in period T . Again, because effort and investment affect pT , then U˜T−1(QT−1) is
strictly increasing and convex (strictly so somewhere). Again, in equilibrium, in period
T −2 the developer is indifferent between selling all of his tokens or keeping all of his tokens.
Therefore, I can write:
U˜T−2(QT−2) = max
eT−2,iT−2,eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−2 − e
2
T−2
2
− iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
which is strictly increasing and convex (strictly so somewhere). Repeating the same argu-
ment implies that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly increasing and convex (strictly so somewhere), and
therefore in every period the only possible equilibrium is one in which the developer is indif-
ferent between selling all of his tokens or purchasing all tokens. All U˜t(Qt) can be written
as:
U˜t(Qt) = max
et,it,et+1,it+1,...,eT ,iT
{
−
T∑
s=t
is −
T∑
s=t
e2s
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
which implies that, in every period, optimal effort and investment are again given by (2) and
(3).
Furthermore, for the agent to be indifferent, in every period the price must be pt =
U˜t+1(M)
M
. Writing the utility function in period t + 1 as above, and using optimal effort and
investment, we get:
pt =
Vt + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
. (15)
It follows that if Qt = M , then:
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
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if instead Qt = 0, then:
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
.
Call αt−1 the probability that in period t − 1 the developer sells all of his tokens. Because
investors must be willing to hold tokens between the two periods, it must be that:
pt−1 =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t+ 1)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
=
αt−1
(
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
+
(1− αt−1)
(
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
.
Solving for αt−1 yields:
αt−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Finally, the above expression can be used to further simplify (15) and achieve (6).
Proof of Lemma 3. As discussed in the text, the choice of QT maximizes the continuation
value:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · p∗T − iT−1),
where p∗T ∈ p(QT ) depends on which equilibrium is expected to emerge in period T . The
important observation is that QT determines the assets available in the following period.
Therefore, by Lemma 2, the continuation value is strictly convex in QT for:
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
pT
,
and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity atM− iT−1+i−AT−1pT ,
given by the minimum number of tokens that the developer needs to sell in order to achieve
i in period T . See Figure 5 for a graphical representation.
Suppose that the “high” equilibrium is expected to emerge, so that pT = max{p(QT )}.
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QT
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT − iT−1)
M − iT−1+i−AT−1
pTQˆ M
Fig. 4: Continuation value as a function of QT .
The discontinuity is at:
Q˜′T ≡ QT :
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
M −QT =
VT−1 + g(e∗(QT ))
(1− γ)M ,
generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2.
If the “low” equilibrium is expected to emerge, then the discontinuity is at:
Q˜′′T = M −
(
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
)
(1− γ)M
f(eT−2, iT−2) + f(eT−1, iT−1)
,
generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2.
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Because period T effort is chosen optimally, it must be that:
g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2,
and:
g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2,
which implies that the two continuation utilities (the one with threshold Q˜′T and the one with
threshold Q˜′′T ) are greater than the continuation utility when the developer holds QT = M
and no investment occurs:
VT−1
(1− γ)MM.
Hence, holding either Q˜′T or Qˆ′′T is preferred to holding the entire stock of tokens M and not
investing. The continuation utility is therefore maximized at either Q˜′T or Qˆ′′T , depending on
what equilibrium is expected to emerge in period T .
Proof of Lemma 5. Remember that Q∗T is the largest possible QT such that the period-
T constraint is not binding. It follows that, as already discussed, if Q∗T ≤ Qˆ then the
continuation value is linear in QT because there is no QT for which the developer will exert
effort in period T .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ then the continuation value is somewhere strictly convex in QT for
QT ≤ Q∗T . In this case, there is the same anti-coordination problem discussed for the “rich
developer” case and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The developer must be indifferent
between QT = 0 and Q∗T .
The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
pT−1 =
UT (Q
∗
T , AT−1 + (QT−1 −Q∗T ) · pT−1 − iT−1)
Q∗T
=
Q∗T
(
VT−1+g(e∗(Q∗T ,i)
(1−γ)M
)
− 12(e∗(Q∗T , i)2 − i
Q∗T
.
Furthermore, investors must be indifferent between holding tokens in period T and in
period T − 1, which implies that:
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T , i))
(1− γ)M ,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period T−1. Combining
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the above two expressions and solving for αT−1 yield the expression in the proposition.
For existence and (sometimes) uniqueness of the equilibrium, without loss of generality,
assume that whenever Q∗ ≤ Qˆ the agent randomizes between max{Q∗T ,M} and 0. In case
the developer holds a positive amount of tokens, this amount can be written as a function
of pT−1:
Q(p) ≡
min
{
QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p ,M
}
if QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p > 0
0 otherwise.
The above expression is increasing whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i (that is, when the developer
needs to sell some tokens in period T − 1 to invest iT = i), and is decreasing otherwise.
Similarly, call p(Q) the equilibrium pT−1 as a function of the number of tokens held by
the developer in case he holds a positive number of tokens. I distinguish between two cases.
Whenever AT−1 − iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer needs to sell some tokens in
period T − 1 to invest iT = i), we have:
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M +

0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ or Q > QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M if Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
,
where:
α(Q) ≡
(
1
2
(e∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))2 + i∗(Q,AT )
)(
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))
(1− γ)M
)−1
.
Because:
QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
< QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
,
for all Q, the case AT−1 − iT−1 < i can be split into three subcases:
1. Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
> Qˆ then for some Q we have:
p(Q) =
{
VT−1
(1− γ)M ,
VT−1 + (1− α(Q))g(e∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M
}
.
That is, there are situations in which for given Q∗T , if pT−1 is low the developer will not
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have enough funds to finance investment in period T , and therefore no development
will occur. If instead pT−1 is high, there is a positive probability that the developer will
invest and exert effort in period T . Again, this situation can be seen as a coordination
problem among investors. For given action taken by the developer in period T − 1,
investors can coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to effort and investment in
period T with positive probability, or a “low” equilibrium leading to no development
in period T .
2. Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(M))g(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M
≤ Qˆ, then there is no development in period T
and p(Q) = VT−1
(1−γ)M for all Q.
3. In all other cases, p(Q) is a function, which is equal to VT−1
(1−γ)M for Q ≤ Qˆ and to
VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise. This function is continuous because, by definition of
Qˆ, we have e∗(Q, i)) = 0.
Instead, whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i (that is, whenever the developer has enough own
funds to invest iT = i), then period T investment does not depend on pT−1 and therefore:
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise,
which is a continuous function.
An important observation is that p(Q) is strictly increasing whenever Q is such that pos-
itive development is expected with some probability in period T , and is constant otherwise.
To see this, use the definition of α(Q) to write:
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M −
1
2
(e∗(Q, i))2 − i = (1− α(Q))Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M . (16)
The LHS of (16) is equal to:
max
e
{
Q · g(e, i)
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
,
which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. It follows that the RHS of (16) must
also be strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. This, in turn, implies that p(Q) is strictly
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increasing whenever Q is such that positive development is expected with some probability
in period T , and is constant otherwise.
The equilibrium of the game is a p∗ such that p∗ = p(Q(p∗)) and a Q∗ = Q(p∗). Figure 6
represents all possible cases. Whenever both p(Q) and Q(p) are continuous functions (when
AT−1− iT−1 ≥ i, and when AT−1− iT−1 < i cases 2 and 3), the existence of the equilibrium is
readily established. It is enough to note that the range of p(Q) is a closed interval. Call this
interval [a, b]. The equilibrium is the fixed point of the continuous function p(Q(p)) defined
over [a, b]. Brower’s fixed point theorem applies and the fixed point exists.
Whenever p(Q) is a correspondence (AT−1− iT−1 < i, case 1) we know that for Qˆ ≤ Q ≤
QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
we have that VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M ∈ p(Q). Define the threshold
value of Q:
Q˜ ≡ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1+(1−α(Q˜))g(e∗(Q˜,i))
(1−γ)M
,
and similarly the corresponding price:
p˜ ≡ VT−1 + (1− α(Q˜))g(e
∗(Q˜, i))
(1− γ)M ∈ p(Q).
By definition of Q(p) we have that Q˜ = Q(p˜), which implies that {Q˜, p˜} is an equilibrium.
As already discussed p(Q) is weakly increasing. In case AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, Q(p) is strictly
decreasing, and the equilibrium is unique. The equilibrium is unique also when AT−1−iT−1 <
i case 2, because p(Q) is constant and Q(p) is increasing. In all other cases multiple equilibria
are possible.
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p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗
(a) AT−1 − iT−1 < i; case 1
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
p∗ = VT−1
(1−γ)M p(Q)
(b) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; case 2
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗TQ
∗
T−2
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
p∗T−2 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗T−1
Q∗T−1
p∗T
(c) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; case 3
p
Q
Qˆ M
Q∗
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
Q(p)
p∗
Q∗
(d) AT−1 − iT−1 > i
Fig. 5: Equilibrium in T − 1
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